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I THE OPERATION OF DISPUTES TRIBUNALS 
"The dominant classes do not object to litigation - they want the courts to 
themselves. " 1 In a society where justice is expensive and dependent on legal expertise, 
this perceived aim of intentional segregation is achieved by a process of monetary and 
intellectual intimidation. The court system is dominated by those who have the 
wealth, the time and the experience to resolve disputes in the courts. Thus 'Joe Corp' 
has access to an authoritative mechanism for resolving disputes, but 'Joe Average' is 
excluded from the process. 
This is especially true where 'Joe Average' is a consumer. Most consumer disputes are 
comparatively 'small claims', yet the court system marginalises these claims by 
creating an artificial threshold below which it is simply not realistic to seek a remedy 
through the courts. It is not practically viable to go to court to recover$ 2000,2 and for 
some people it is not even an option. Few consumers are aware of their legal rights 
and fewer still have the knowledge, experience or finance to pursue an action against a 
trader in the District Court. Nonetheless, " .. .it is estimated that one in six consumer 
transactions results in some justifiable complaint against a trader. "3 
This raises some serious issues concerning the nature of 'justice' in our justice system. 
Should everyone have access to justice, or should it be reserved for those who can 
afford it? Are 'justice' and 'the law' different expressions of the same value? Is there 
one right way for reaching a just resolution or does it depend on the circumstances of 
the case? Where should the line be drawn between due process and flexibility in 
administering justice and on what factors does this depend? 
The advent of Small Claims Tribunals in 1976 aimed to address these issues. The 
Small Claims Tribunals were an experiment in the administration of justice.4 They 
were established on a necessarily informal model with a focus on mediation and a 
'substantial merits and justice' approach to dispute resolution.5 This was o a to be 
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responsive to individual circumstances and to place the responsibility for dispute 
resolution in the hands of the parties, and thereby the community. Initially the 
Tribunals' jurisdiction was limited to claims not exceeding $ 500, though this was 
expanded to $ 1000 in I 985. The cost of bringing a claim to the Tribunal was only $ 
2, and later only $ 5. Thus a deserving applicant was not prevented from bringing a 
'small claim' by prohibitive legal costs. 
The Small Claims Tribunals were an "experiment that worked"6, and in recognition of 
their success Parliament introduced the Disputes Tribunals Act in 1988. This 
extended the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and increased the monetary limit to $ 3000. 
It appears that the experiment is still working, the tribunals currently being used to 
capacity.7 There are now 56 Disputes Tribunals across New Zealand, attatched to all 
District Courts and the cost to the applicant is just $10 for claims not exceeding $ 
1 OOO, and $ 20 for anything in excess of that. 
However, it is not only in cost that Tribunals aim to make themselves more accessible 
to the general public. Referees are nominated by the community and are selected 
against a list of very broad criteria.8 Legal qualifications are not necessary, and only 
about a quarter of referees are currently legally qualified, the emphasis still being a 
'substantial merits and justice' approach to dispute resolution, rather than strict 
legalism.9 In addition, sixty eight percent of referees are female and there are 
currently four Maori and three Pacific Island referees. Thus Disputes Tribunals are 
more representative of the community than the courts currently are. 10 This is in an 
effort to make tribunals more accessible to the whole community, not just white, 
middle class business men with experience in the law and in the legal process. 
These factors clearly represent the philosophy behind Disputes Tribunals, perhaps best 
stated by the Honourable Phillip Woolaston, the Associate Minister of Justice at the 
1 
time the Disputes Tribunals Bill was introduced: 
They [Disputes Tribunals] provide remedies where before there were none - or none 
in any realistic or sensible sense - and in providing low cost remedies for modest 
claims, they give ordinary individuals some scope for asserting their rights. 11 
It is little wonder that the Ministry of Consumer Affairs 11 ••• views Disputes Tribunals 
as the most important forum for hearing and resolving consumer diisputes. 11 12 They 
provide consumers access to a fair system for dispute resolution where before there 
was none. Access to justice is more than a theoretical precept. There are a number of 
practical determinants also, which the Tribunals, unlike the courts, seek to implement. 
The issues associated with access to justice are inherently linked to the question of 
jurisdiction. This paper is concerned with the nature and scope of the Disputes 
Tribunals' contractual jurisdiction, especially in relation to consumer legislation and 
the disputes between traders and consumers based on that legislation. As such it is 
largely an exercise in statutory interpretation which draws on the function and purpose 
behind the Disputes Tribunals Act in combination with such Acts as the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981, the Hire Purchase Act 1971 and the Door to Door Sales Act 
1967. 
It has been necessary to limit the discussion in this way so as to enable a more detailed 
analysis of the juridictional issues involved. This does not limit the importance of the 
discussion. With the advent of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 and the 
enforcement of consumer legislation in general, there is greater exposure being given 
to illegal trade practices and the concurrent neglect of consumer rights. It is necessary 
therefore to review the exact cope for enforcing those rights. Furthermore, while the 
focus is quite specific, the general principles of access to justice, the viability of 
informal justice and the effectiveness of state regulation on the market-place impact 
on every element of the justice system and society in general . 
1 Kynastonp H ish 
-----
These issues are current, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs having recently prepared a 
report on the operation of Disputes Tribunals for the Justice Department, 13 with a 
view to reform. This includes a review of the Tribunals' present jurisdiction in the 
light of present and future day requirements. With the proposed abandonment of 
appeals to the Privy Council the organisation of the justice system is a priority 
concern. It is likely that Disputes Tribunals will assume an even greater role in New 
Zealand's justice system and therefore limits on jurisdiction and the rights to appeal 
are critical issues to be resolved. 
This is the initial focus of inquiry. Part II outlines the special jurisdiction given to 
Tribunals and the limited appeal provisions contained in the Disputes Tribunals Act, 
and critically evaluates the relevant provisions against the nature and purpose of the 
Act. Part III discusses the jurisdiction of the Tribunals with specific reference to the 
Credit Contracts, Hire Purchase and Door to Door Sales Acts. Part IV argues for the 
extension of the current jurisdiction with respect to these Acts. Part V completes the 
analysis by suggesting some measures for reform and discussing their relative merits. 
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II A QUASI-LEGAL JURISDICTION 
A The Right to Appeal 
In accordance with section 23 of the Disputes Tribunals Act, Disputes Tribunals are a 
court of final jurisdiction. There are three exceptions to this: 
( a) Rehearings 
A party to the proceedings can apply for a rehearing under section 49 of the Disputes 
Tribunals Act. These are granted at the sole discretion of the referee and some 
substantive reason is required. A rehearing will not be granted merely because a party 
does not like the decision. 14 
( b) Judicial Review 
The normal rules apply. The parties are entitled to natural justice IS and any party can 
apply to the High Court for review under the Judicature Act 1908. 
( c) Appeals to the District Court 
Rights to appeal are creatures of statute. 16 Thus the only grounds on which an appeal 
can be made from the decision of a Disputes Tribunal are those specified in the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. Section 50 provides for an appeal only if: 
(l)(a) The proceedings were conducted by the Referee; or 
(b) An inquiry was carried out by an investigator-
in a manner that was unfair to the appellant and prejudicially affected the result of the 
proceedings. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection ( l) of this section, a Referee shall be 
deemed to have conducted the proceedings in a manner that was unfair to the 
appellant and prejudicially affected the result if-
(a) The Referee fails to have regard to any provision of any enactment that is 
brought to the attention of the Referee at the hearing; and 
(b) A a result of that failure, the result of the proceedings is unfair to the appellant. 
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This section 1s quite straightforward. The apellant must show that the process by 
which the Tribunal reached its decision was unfair and that this prejudicially affected 
the outcome. The right to an appeal is not determined solely by reference to the 
substantive outcome, but primarily by reference to any procedural unfairness . Section 
50(2) is expressed as one instance of procedural unfairness. It does not create new 
grounds for an appeal based on the merits of a decision. 17 Thus the grounds for appeal 
are quite limited. 
Judicial concern over the extent of this limitation has led some District Court Judges 
to 'creative interpretation', expanding the meaning of section 50 to allow appeals on 
questions of Jaw and on the the substantial merits and justice of the case. 18 This has 
superimposed the jurisdiction of the District Court over that of the Disputes Tribunals 
and has thereby served to restrict the operation and effectiveness of Tribunals as an 
efficient and widely accessible tribunal for resolving comparatively small disputes. 
These interpretations have turned largely on the meanings of section 50(2) and section 
18(6) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
B The Scope of Section 18(6) - Having Regard to the Law 
Section 18(6) of the Disputes Tribunals Act is central to the operation of Disputes 
Tribunals. It empowers Referees to disregard the law and thereby enables the efficient 
dispensation of justice on an individualised basis, without the prohibitive cost of 
lawyers or the barriers thrown up by legal rhetoric. Section 18(6) provides: 
The Tribunal shall determine the dispute according to the substantial merits and 
justice of the case, and in doing so shall have regard to the law but shall not be bound 
to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities. 
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The basic issue which anses from section 18(6) is, to what extent is a Tribunal 
required to follow and apply the relevant law in a particular case? The answer impacts 
directly on the right to appeal under section 50, the operational efficacy of the 
Tribunals and the individual's right to a just resolution. As such it is a difficult issue 
with important ramifications and there is some variance of opinion on it. 
1 Justice is the Law 
One argument is to say that the substantial merits and justice of the case cannot be met 
unless the relevant law is applied. Two cases are particularly instructive on this point. 
State Insurance v Watkins19 and State Insurance v Armstrong20 were decided 
differently by different judges, despite having exactly analogous fact situations. The 
cases involved contested insurance claims for damage arising from traffic accidents. 
Both claimants had falsely stated on their respective claims that they had not 
consumed alcohol six hours prior to their accident. This gave the insurance company 
a legal right to decline liability. In the Disputes Tribunal the referee in each case 
awarded in favour of the claimant because alcohol had not been a causative factor in 
either accident. State Insurance appealed to the District Court. In Watkins21 Cullinane 
J reasoned: 
.. .in so far as the Tribunal in the present case did not have regard to the law in the 
sense that legal principles concerning the rights and liabilities of parties under 
insurance contracts were disregarded, the "substantial merits and justice of the case" 
were not objectives achieved by reason of that failure. 22 
The argument is that disregarding the law defeats the merits. Because the case was not 
decided on its substantial merits and justice, the proceedings were conducted unfairly 
and therefore the grounds for appeal under section 50 were established. The appeal 
was allowed. 
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In Armstrong23 Paterson J dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. With respect, 
this is the better view. The legislature has clearly awarded Tribunals the discretion to 
choose not to follow the law where it conflicts with the substantial merits and justice 
of the case. This is apparent for two reasons. 
Firstly, in the initial consideration given to jurisdiction in the drafting of the Small 
Claims Tribunals Bill, there was a provision which would have required Referees to 
follow all applicable enactments. This was subsequently deleted before the Bill 
became law.24 Also at the drafting stage there was some debate about the content of 
section 15(4) - the equivalent to section 18(6) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. The 
Parliamentary Counsel preferred a decision based on the law unless the merits pointed 
elsewhere. The Department of Justice opted instead for a clean break from the law. 
The latter view prevailed after it was referred to the Government Caucus 
Committee.25 The same section, and therefore the same legislative intention, was 
carried across into the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
Secondly, the ordinary construction of the Act supports a merits based approach as 
distinct from a strictly legal one. A merits based approach looks not only to the law 
but to all the circumstances of the case in order to reach a just resolution. The law is a 
relevant consideration. In a legal approach it is the only consideration, and in a court 
of law a judge is bound to apply the law. Section 18(6) expressly states that a Tribunal 
shall not be bound to apply the law. The two approaches are different. 
There is good reason for this. If strict adherence to the law is a requirement then legal 
expertise is also a requirement. This imports the need for legally trained referee and 
legal representation at the Tribunal. An adversarial , legal approach discourages 
laypeople from bringing claims against better financed, more informed respondents 
such as businesses, who are repeat users of the system. This is especially true if the 
claimant knows that the respondent can and will appeal. Moreso, the additional delay 
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and expense involved will be prohibitive given the comparatively small amounts 
involved. Furthermore, a Tribunal bound by precedent would not have the flexibility 
to dispense justice according to the vast array of everyday ituations which come 
before it. The Disputes Tribunals Act expressly legislates against these factors. For 
instance: 
* Section 18( l) - the Tribunal must decide whether mediation is appropriate. 
The focus is on the parties reaching their own resolution if possible. This will not 
depend on the law, but on the circumstances of the case. 
* Sections 38(7)(c) and 43 - lawyers cannot be present and the Tribunal has 
only a very limited power to grant costs. The bias is against lawyers and in favour of 
parties representing themselves. Many claimants, and indeed many respondents, will 
either not be aware of the law or simply unable to apply it. 
* Section 7 - legal training is not specified as a qualification for becoming a 
referee. This can be contrasted with section 7 of the Small Claims Tribunals Act l 976 
which it replaced. The l 976 Act specified three years practice as either a barrister or a 
solicitor as one of the possible criteria for becoming a referee. 
* Section 40 - the Tribunal can take into account any evidence that it 
considers appropriate, even though that evidence may not be admissable in a court of 
law. 
Clearly the focus of Disputes Tribunals is not the law. Of course this is not a licence 
to completely disregard any relevant law and it is not used as such. If a referee is 
aware that there is an important legal issue involved, or relevant legal principles are 
brought to their attention, then section l 8(6) requires that they have regard to that law. 
The Disputes Tribunals Act probably imposes an obligation on referees to: 
... consider any legal principles of which he or she is made aware in a fair and 
unbiased manner, and to apply the law except when strict adherence would go against 
the substantial merits and justice of the case. 26 
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A groundless refusal to consider the law, or an arbitrary decision not to apply it, will 
probably amount to procedural unfairness as anticipated by section 50. However, if a 
referee has regard to the law and decides on the substantial merits and justice of the 
case not to apply it, that decision cannot be appealed. In any case most referees have 
commented that: 
... the 'law' and 'merits and justice' seldom conflict in the areas within the Tribunals' 
jurisdiction ... the law acts to guard against arbitrariness, and substantial merits and 
justice 'humanise' the law, prevent the inequitable use of the law, are particularly 
useful in a laypersons' tribunal , and are useful reference points in explaining the 
decisions reached. 27 
The two values; the 'law' and 'merits and justice' are distinct and each makes an 
important contribution to the decision making process of the Disputes Tribunals. 
Therefore in a case such as Watkins28, where a referee decides not to follow the law 
because the substantial merits and justice of the case do not warrant it, that decision is 
not open to appeal under section 50 of the Disputes Tribunals Act. Such an appeal 
would be an appeal on the merits of the case, not against the manner in which the 
proceedings were conducted. 
2 Common law interpretations of statute 
Section 50(2) grants a right of appeal if the Referee fails to have regard to any 
enactment brought to their attention and this unfairly affects the result. G P Rossiter 
reasons that "the logical corollary of that is that judicial interpretations of a statute 
must also be borne in mind" .29 Unless a Tribunal has regard to the relevant 
interpretations of higher courts when addressing a statute, the requirements of section 
50(2) have not been met, and an appeal should be granted. 
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While persuasive, this argument imports too much into section 50(2). As argued in the 
previous section Parliament did not intend for Tribunals to become over-legalised. 
The rationale behind section 50(2) is best summed up in NZ/ Insurance NZ Ltd v 
Auckland District Court: 
.. . whereas it might be thought unrealistic to require referees to have regard to 
common law principles, it would not be unreasonable or beyond the competence of a 
person qualified for appointment as a referee to expect him or her to have regard to 
relevant statutory provisions if they were brought to the referees attention at the 
hearing.30 
Requiring referees to research , interpret and apply the relevant statutory 
interpretations in every case is practically inexpedient and detrimental to the operation 
and accessibility of Tribunals for administering justice at this level. What this also 
illustrates is that the jurisdictional boundaries are unclear and therefore these types of 
cases are not easily resolved by looking at the jurisdictional provisions of the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. The focus is the substantial merits and justice of the case. 
3 Getting the law right 
A party cannot appeal on the grounds that a referee based their decision on a mistake 
of law.31 This entails that there is no control on the section 18(6) requirement that a 
referee have regard to the law insofar as this means getting the law right. This can be 
problematic. In Saban v Crone32 the appellant agreed to allow his neighbour, the 
respondent, to prune a tree on the appellant's property. The respondent went about the 
task with some dedication and 'pruned' the tree to a stump, leaving the branches on the 
appellant's property. The appellant applied to the Small Claims Tribunal for 
compensation, alleging that he had specified a minimum height. The referee, unable to 
prefer the evidence of either party, dismissed the claim. The appellant then appealed 
to the District Court on the grounds that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the 
claim. 
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The Court accepted that as there was no contract - only a gratuitous licence - the 
Tribunal had made its determination outside the bounds of its jurisdiction. However 
the appeal was also dismissed. The question of jurisdiction was a question of law and 
as such was not a proper subject for appeal. 
Is this a matter for concern? There is some protection in the Act against mistakes of 
law. Firstly, in situations where jurisdiction is mistakenly asserted by the Tribunal, the 
decision of the Tribunal is a nullity and can be struck out in an application for review 
in the High Court. Nevertheless, the costs of review are likely to be prohibitive given 
the sums involved. Secondly, the decision must be based on the substantial merits and 
justice of the case. There may be some situations, albeit a limited number, where an 
appellant can show that by misconstruing the law, this object was not acheived by the 
Tribunal and therefore the proceedings were conducted unfairly. For example a referee 
may decide in a particular case that the substantial merits and justice favour one party 
simply because the law is in their favour. If that 'law' is wrong then the case would no 
longer be decided on its merits. In practice, however, this will be difficult to show as a 
referee is unlikely to make a decision solely on the basis that it is the law. It is more 
likely that the law will be used to support other substantive considerations which go 
towards the merits of the particular case and therefore an appellant would be unable to 
challenge the decision. 
Therefore the protection afforded by the Act is limited and it may be that some 
measure of reform is necessary to address this.33 
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4 The Tribunal is not bound to give effect to strict legal rights ... 
Peter Watts argues that: 
... the use of the words "strict legal rights" is consistent only with the Tribunals not 
being required to make an order in favour of someone who has a common law right, 
not also with their conferring on someone a right which they would not have at 
common law.34 
This interpretation is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, by refusing to enforce one 
party's common law rights, a Tribunal is in effect conferring a right, or an immunity, 
on another party which they would not ordinarily have at common law. Secondly, it 
fails to accord section 18(6) its full and natural meaning. This is especially true since 
Watts believes that a Tribunal can only ignore obstructive technicalities.This is not the 
case. Section 18(6) refers to rights and obligations and contrasts them with mere 
forms and technicalities. 
To illustrate his point, Watts uses the example of a promise given without 
consideration. According to Watts, the promisee could not enforce the promise in a 
Disputes Tribunal. This is true, but not because of any limits on section 18(6). Rather 
it is because there is no contract and therefore no jurisdiction under section l 0( l) of 
the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
A better example might be where the parties dispute the existence of an implied term. 
The Tribunal, by its jurisdiction under section 18(6) could disregard the legal 
requirement that the term be necessary for business efficacy and imply a term if the 
substantial merits and justice of the case warranted such an implication. In doing so 
the Tribunal would be conferring a right which would not ordinarily exist at common 
law. Thus the interpretation suggested by Watts is to restrictive and fails to recognise 
the full extent of the quasi-legal jurisdiction open to Disputes Tribunals. 
~ . .. \ ;. 
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5 Summary 
An appeal can only be made from the decision of Disputes Tribunal on the grounds 
specified in section 50 of the Disputes Tribunals Act. This means that an appeal 
cannot be based on the grounds that the referee chose not to apply the Jaw or applied 
the law incorrectly, unless he or she did so in a manner which was procedurally unfair 
to the appellant. This entails the following: 
* The referee must base their decision on the substantial merits and justice of 
the case, in accordance with section 18(6). A referee is not bound to apply the law. 
* The referee must consider any relevant legislation brought to their attention, 
otherwise there is granted a right to appeal under section 50(2). 
* There is also an obligation on the referee to consider any other legal 
principles of which he or she is aware in an unbiased manner, and to apply those 
principles except insofar as they conflict with the substantial merits and justice of the 
case. Otherwise an appeal will lie under section 50( l ). This does not impose a duty to 
know the Jaw in every situation. 
* A party cannot appeal on a question of law. Therefore, where a Tribunal acts 
outside its statutory jurisdiction, that action will be reviewable in the High Court only. 
* There can be no appeal on the merits of a Tribunal's decision. The discretion 
awarded to referees is final. 
C A Quasi-legal Jurisdiction - a Necessary Feature 
The limited grounds for appeal mean that in effect there is little or no control over the 
section 18(6) requirement that a Tribunal shall have regard to the law. Errors can and 
will occur for which there will be no remedy. 
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However, the loss of a right to complain about errors of law perpetuated by a lay-
referee is a small price to pay for speed, simplicity and finality. 35 Strict legality is 
merely a factor in a political calculus where other values take precedence. If the focus 
is on strict adherence to the law, inevitably there will be an increase in lawyer 
involvement. This will increase the cost and the time it takes to resolve a dispute in 
the Disputes Tribunal. Advocacy and litigation will erode the ability of Disputes 
Tribunals to mediate disputes and the doctrine of precedent will prevent resolutions 
from being 'tailor-made' to suit particular grievances between particular disputants. 
There is a more fundamental concern. Disputes Tribunals do not just provide faster, 
cheaper justice for those who would have obtained justice anyway. They also provide 
access to justice where previously there was none. To resolve a dispute in the courts 
takes a considerable amount of effort and expense. These factors alone are enough to 
deter would be claimants from filing a claim, especially where the cost of the claim 
exceeds the sum in dispute. This is plainly not satisfactory. If the law, and therefore 
lawyers, are to be a necessary part of the process, then the Disputes Tribunals are no 
different from the Courts: time consuming and expensive. 
I Informaljustice 
Disputes Tribunals should not be available to only a privileged few. That is why the 
emphasis is on appointing referees from the community; from both sexes and from 
different cultural backgrounds. Not everyone is able to cast their grievance within a 
legal framework and many people feel intimidated by the law and all its trappings. 
The e people should not be prevented from expressing their legitimate grievances 
because the Jaw is not accessible to them. This is not to say the law is irrelevant. It is 
not. The law is an important part of the dispute resolution process, and individuals 
should be encouraged to know their legal rights and obligations, especially as 
responsible consumers. Disputes Tribunals can aid in this process. They allow 
individuals to present their own case and are responsive to both the law and the 
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'substantial merits and justice of the case'. Thus Tribunals enable access to justice, but 
it is a different kind of justice and this raises issues of its own. 
Tribunals are not perfect. Not everyone will be able to present their own case and 
often there will be an imbalance of power between the two parties so that a mediated 
settlement is likely be biased in favour of the stronger party. This is common in 
consumer disputes. Most consumers are likely to bring isolated claims against traders 
who have used the system many times. 
The Disputes Tribunals Act aims to minimise the effects of this. Section 38(2) permits 
a Tribunal to approve a representative if it is appropriate in the circumstances. Section 
38(3) specifies certain instances where it will be appropriate, such as where one party 
is a minor or is unable to present his or her case adequately. Under section 38(5) 
support persons are permitted to be present, though they may not speak. The Justice 
Department also provides interpreters where necessary, although half of the Tribunals 
providing this service currently charge for it.36 Perhaps most importantly, by virtue of 
section 18(3) there is no obligation on referees to approve an agreed settlement. This 
can serve to protect one party from being 'rail-roaded' into an agreement which they do 
not support. 
Under section 18(1) the Tribunal must first assess whether mediation is appropriate. 
This provision differs from section 15(1) of the Small Claims Tribunals Act which 
placed the primary focus on agreed settlements. Nonetheless, both tribunals acted as a 
mediation/arbitration hybrid. This type of informal jurisdiction has been criticised on 
the grounds that it is overly intrusive and coerces the parties into agreeing to an 
unsatisfactory settlement: 
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... an arbitrator's impartiality is impaired if she participates in confidential caucuses 
with the disputants under the auspices of a mediator. Instead of retaining the formal 
distinction between mediation and arbitration, which emphasizes differences between 
the authority of an arbitrator to make a binding decision and the tools of persuasion 
available to the mediator who merely recommends a olution, together they function 
to transform the mediation process into a more proactive type of intervention than 
pure mediation implies.37 
The parties may reveal confidential information to the referee acting as a mediator 
which they would not have revealed to a referee acting as an arbitrator. This 
compromises the referee's objectivity as an arbitrator and undermines the effectiveness 
of mediation. The parties know that if they do not reach an agreed settlement the 
referee will 'reach an agreement for them'. This forces the parties to reach their own 
'agreement' as they have already divulged any information which would have been 
kept confidential in an adjudicatory setting. Furthermore, there is a danger that 
mediation will dissolve into mere compromise. 
A recent report by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs found that one half of consumers 
who had settled their dispute by agreement were dissatisfied with the settlement; 
"[s]ome felt pressured to settle, others just 'gave up'."38 This is not encouraging and 
suggests that the Disputes Tribunals may actually be undermining the rights of 
consumers and therefore any 'justice' gained through increased access. 
However, overall most consumers were satisfied with their experience in Disputes 
Tribunals39 and it is likely that the satisfaction rates for consumers in the District 
Court (those of them who got there) will be lower still. Disputes Tribunals, because of 
their special jurisdiction have the benefit of flexibility; they are faster and more 
responsive to particular fact situations than the courts. The mediation/adjudication 
hybrid enables the referee to dispense with talemates and he or she can also a sign 
different processes to different elements of a dispute. For example the referee might 
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make a ruling on the quantam of a debt, but let the parties negotiate an appropriate 
repayment schedule to suit themselves. The referee can also decide what process will 
best suit the parties in the circumstances. This decision is critical as it will be 
determinative of the parties' satisfaction with the outcome. Ultimately, therefore, the 
success of mediation will depend on the quality of the referee. This is recognised by 
the Justice Department and is a factor in employing and training Referees.40 
The informality of Disputes Tribunals not only makes Tribunals more accessible, it 
also allows them to operate a broad spectrum of services which were not previously 
available. They are an avenue for the lay person to obtain justice or even just to 
" ... 'have their say', be listened to and have things clarified in their minds."41 A 
singular, exclusively legal approach cannot and should not be applied to this type of 
claim. Often hearings are used to explain why a debt has not been paid and to arrange 
for payment by instalments. It is reasonable to assume that people are more likely to 
meet their obligations where they have negotiated a realistic repayment schedule 
themselves, than where one has been imposed by the Courts.42 The law is of no use in 
this situation because ultimately it is practical considerations, such as the parties' 
means, which will determine the outcome. 
Thus the more informal a small claims resolution system is, the more effective it is at 
targeting the the sorts of claims and parties the system is designed to reach. 
Experience in both New Zealand and in other jurisdictions has consistently shown this 
to be the case. 
In New Zealand the Courts of Request, established in 1844, fulfilled the same function 
as the modern-day Disputes Tribunals, at least insofar as they addressed small claims. 
There was one important difference: their directive was to "proceed according to the 
laws in force." 43 Given this, it is not surprising that they were short-lived. They 
parallelled the ordinary courts in their operation, fulfilled no distinctive function and 
were accordingly disestablished.44 
The London Small Claims Courts suffered a similar fate because again they remained 
overly legalistic. Claimants were advised to obtain legal advice, and even though the 
adjudicators played an investigatory role, the hearings were conducted adversarily 
with almost exclusive reference to the law. This resulted in the 'capture' of the Small 
Claims Courts by businesses and repeat users. Individuals seldom appeared, except as 
defendants and even then they were unlikely to file a defence. The system lasted only 
six years.45 In Northern Ireland, in 1989, the set-up was essentially the same. Business 
claimants out-numbered individuals by twelve to one, and individuals seldom filed a 
defence to a claim.46 
In Canada, Small Claims Courts were widely criticised in the l 970's for being 
dominated by businesses who used them largely as debt collection agencies. In 
response to this criticism the Courts were informalised to a greater degree, and the 
public perception of them is now generally more favourable.47 
What can be gleaned from these examples is that not only is an informal approach to 
dispute resolution appropriate for Disputes Tribunals, it is probably also a necessary 
feature of their continued existence. It is a straightforward equation: unless Tribunals 
are accessible, consumers will not use them. Disputes Tribunals will not be accessible 
if they are perceived and operated as a strictly legal forum because the legal process 
involved in bringing a claim to the Tribunal: 
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• costs too much; 
• takes too long; 
• is too inflexible to respond to individual circumstances; 
• is too alien and complex for the ordinary person to comprehend; and 
• is too intimidating for the ordinary person to even want to invoke. 
Therefore it is best that the quasi-legal jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals be retained 
so that they remain as efficient and as non-terrifying as possible, while still providing 
a widely acceptable and authoritative mechanism for resolving disputes. 
2 Grounds for appeal 
Once the viability of the Tribunals' quasi-legal jurisdiction is accepted, then 
necessarily the grounds for appeal must be limited. Regarding this, Phillip Woolaston, 
the Associate Minister of Justice at the time the Disputes Tribunals Bill was 
introduced, stated: 
Appeals on the merits are totally inconsistent with the legislation, for the simple 
reason that the way by which a solution is arrived at in a Tribunal is quite different 
from the rules and procedures that apply in ordinary Courts.48 
Thus it is Parliament's clear intention that Tribunals should operate differently from 
the ordinary courts. Because of this, appeals on the merits and on que tions of law are 
not permitted by the Disputes Tribunals Act. It is only when the hearing is marred by 
procedural unfairness that an appeal can be heard by the District Court. This is entirely 
appropriate. 
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III THE SCOPE OF THE TRIBUNALS' JURISDICTION 
A The Primary Jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals 
A discussion of jurisdiction involves two different types of question: 
(i) Whether a particular kind of claim can be heard by a Disputes Tribunal 
(claim jurisdiction) ; and 
(ii) Whether a Disputes Tribunal has the power to make a particular type of 
order (power jurisdiction). 
The claim jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals is established primarily by section l 0( l) 
of the Disputes Tribunals Act. It provides that a Tribunal shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of: 
(a) a claim founded on contract or quasi-contract; and 
(b) a claim for a declaration that a person is not liable to another person in respect of a claim 
or demand, founded on contract or quasi-contract, made against that person by that other person .. . 
An action is 'founded on contract' if it " .. .is one for the successful maintenance of 
which it is necessary to rely on, or prove, a contract. "49 It is not necessary that an 
actual term of the contract be in dispute. 
Section 10(2) of the Disputes Tribunals Act supplements section 10( 1 ). It states that a 
Tribunal shall have such other jurisdiction as is conferred on it by any other 
enactment, specified in the first schedule. Thus subsequent legislation confirms the 
specific jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals in respect of that legislation, but cannot 
derogate from any pre-existing jurisdiction established under section 10( I) of the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. This is important because the Justice Department has 
interpreted two enactments specified in the first schedule - the Credit Contracts Act 
1981 and the Hire Purchase Act 1971 - in such a way that they do just that. 50 These 
two Acts supposedly limit the ambit of the Tribunal 'jurisdiction under section I 0(1 ) 
of the Disputes Tribunals Act, rather than merely adding to it. 
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It should be noted that section I 0(1) is subject to the rest of section 10 - and therefore 
to section 10(2). However the wording of section 10(2) is explicit; Parliament clearly 
intended for it to expand on the primary jurisdiction created by section I 0(1 ). That is 
the ordinary meaning of the words 'shall have such other jurisdiction'. The main 
reason that section I 0( 1) is subject to the rest of section 10 is so that the Tribunal can 
only exercise its jurisdiction when the total amount claimed does not exceed $ 3000. 
The fact that section 10(1) is subject to section I 0(2) merely denotes that section l 0( I) 
is not exclusive of any subsequent jurisdiction. 
B The Credit Contracts Act 1981 
The principle of uniform disclosure is fundamental to the Credit Contracts Act.51 This 
is enforced under the disclosure provisions contained in Part II of the Act. These 
provisions set down the disclosure requirements and enable a court to declare a 
contract unenforceable and impose stringent penalties for non-disclosure, as well as 
being able to grant relief from these. Nonetheless, for credit agreements involving a 
relatively low principal, the disclosure provisions of the Credit Contracts Act are 
frequently corrupted. There are two reasons for this: 
(i) Consumers are not aware of their rights under the Credit Contracts Act; and 
(ii) at present, enforcement is only possible throught the courts. Therefore, 
where relatively small sums of money are involved, the Credit Contracts Act is 
practically unenforceable because it is simply not worth the expense, time and effort 
to bring a claim to court. 
The blame for this lies partly with Parliament for drafting unclear consumer 
legislation, but primarily with the Justice Department for taking an unnecesarily 
restrictive approach to that legislation. 
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I The restrictive approach 
Section 45A( I) of the Credit Contracts Act provides that a Tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction to exercise any power conferred on a court by Part I of this Act. The Act is 
silent with respect to Part II. The implication is that a Tribunal has no jurisdiction with 
respect to the disclosure provisions contained in Part II, by the maxim expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius. 52 The sections in the various enactments which confer 
jurisdiction on Disputes Tribunals are very specific. The argument is that such 
particularity denotes Parliament's intention to limit the jurisdiction of Disputes 
Tribunals to those sections expressly mentioned. 
It is submitted that this argument is by no means conclusive and furthermore , that 
there is scope within the existing legislation for Disputes Tribunals to have 
jurisdiction with respect to Part II of the Credit Contracts Act. Moreso, jurisdiction is 
not only possible, it is necessary to achieve the objectives of both the Credit Contracts 
and Disputes Tribunals Acts . 
2 Alternative interpretations 
'Expressio unius' is only a maxim. "Allowance must always be made for the fact that 
the 'exclusio ' may have been accidental , still more for the fact that there may have 
been good reason for it. "53 Prior to the enactment of section 45A(l) of the Credit 
Contracts Act, a Disputes Tribunal had no power to re-open an oppre sive credit 
contract within the meaning of Part I of that Act.54 By virtue of sections 18 and 19 of 
the Disputes Tribunals Act however, a Disputes Tribunal already had the 
jurisdictional power to enforce the statutory rights and obligations arising under Part II 
of the Credit Contracts Act. Therefore, an express reference to Part II would have 
been superfluous or, at the very least, conceivably overlooked. 
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This can be contrasted with the jurisdiction of District Courts conferred by section 45 
of the Credit Contracts Act. District Courts are given express jurisdiction over the 
entire Act. However, unlike the Disputes Tribunals Act, the District Courts Act 1947 
did not contain provision for the exercise of the kinds of powers anticipated by Part II 
of the Credit Contracts Act. For example, section 33 of the Credit Contracts Act 
provides for the alteration of the penalties for non-disclosure by agreement between 
the parties. Prior to the enactment of section 45 of the Credit Contracts Act, a District 
Court would not have had the power jurisdiction to enforce such an agreement. A 
Disputes Tribunal, by comparison, could enforce such an agreement by virtue of 
section 18(3) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
Remember the primary claim jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals is created by section 
10(1) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. The powers a Tribunal can legitimately exercise 
are those specified in Sections 18 and 19 of the same act. Section 45A( l) of the Credit 
Contracts Act is part of the supplementary jurisdiction introduced by section l 0(2) of 
the Disputes Tribunals Act. As such it should be additional to the primary jurisdiction 
established by the Disputes Tribunals Act. The Disputes Tribunals Act is the 
empowering Act of the Tribunals; it created the Tribunals and defines their nature and 
scope. A tacit implication from section 45A(l) of the Credit Contracts Act should in 
no way limit this. To do so is to limit the very nature and purpose of Disputes 
Tribunals. 
3 Tuulua v Jackson Investments Ltd55 
This was a claim brought before a Disputes Tribunal. It can serve as a useful example 
as to how a Tribunal might exercise its jurisdiction over the dislosure provisions 
contained in Part II of the Credit Contracts Act. 
The applicants (T) purchased purchased a car from the respondent (J), subject to a 
controlled credit contract. Over an eight month period, T made a number of payments 
to J, until they were informed by J that they were in arrears pursuant to the agreement. 
However, due to an error on J's part, T had never received a copy of the agreement. 
On being informed of this, J immediately posted a copy of the agreement to T. The 
sale price shown on the agreement was disputed by T. They claimed that the agreed 
price was $ 8700, whereas the credit agreement showed the total price to be $ 9 OOO. T 
lodged a claim with the Disputes Tribunal to have the sale price reduced to the lower 
figure of$ 8 700. 
At an interim hearing the parties agreed that the sale price should be $ 8 700. The 
Referee also decided that initial disclosure had not been made in accordance with 
section 16 of the Credit Contracts Act and that therefore J might be liable for penalties 
under section 25 of that Act. This would entitle T to receive a maximum of$ 5 672.40 
from J. The referee invited the parties to prepare submissions on the claim and 
adjourned the hearing sine die. At the subsequent hearing the referee struck out the 
claim on the grounds that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction with respect to Part II of the 
Credit Contracts Act. 
With respect, it is submitted that this determination was mistaken and that the 
Tribunal had the necessary jurisdiction under the Disputes Tribunals Act. In order to 
invoke the disclosure provisions under Part II, a party must first prove a 'controlled 
credit contract' as defined by the Credit Contracts Act, section 15. Therefore, any 
action under Part II will either be 'founded on contract' or for a declaration of non-
liability for a claim founded on contract, and comes under the claim jurisdiction 
established by section I 0( I) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
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4 The power jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals 
As well as the general claim jurisdiction established by section 10(1), the Tribunal 
also has its own power jurisdiction, conferred by sections 18 and 19 of the Disputes 
Tribunals Act,56 which it can exercise so as to enforce the Credit Contracts Act. 
Therefore the Tribunal in Tuulua v Jackson57 could have: 
(i) enforced the parties' agreement on the lower sale price, under section 18(3) 
of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
(ii) decided whether the disclosure provisions of the Credit Contracts Act had 
been breached, by virtue of its section I 0( I) claim jurisdiction. 
(iii) enforced the statutory penalties for non-disclosure. Whether a penalty 
applies is not a matter of discretion. It is a statutory entitlement which applies 
automatically, subject to an application by the credit provider under sections 31 to 33 
of the Credit Contracts Act. The Tribunal is empowered by section 19( I )(a) to order 
one party to pay money to another. That is exactly the effect of a monetary penalty 
under the Credit Contracts Act. The Tribunal would not have been exercising a power 
under the Credit Contracts Act. It would have exercised a power under its own 
jurisdiction, conferred by the Disputes Tribunals Act, in accordance with the statutory 
rights and entitlements contained in Part II of the Credit Contracts Act. 
(iv) declared the agreement unenforceable in accordance with section 24 of the 
Credit Contracts Act, under section 19(1 )(b) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
(v) granted relief for inadvertent non-disclosure as provided in section 31 of 
the Credit Contracts Act. The same powers contemplated in section 31 are contained 
in section 19( 1 )(b) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. Again, the tatutory rights and 
entitlements contained in the Credit Contracts Act would not be enforced by a 
Disputes Tribunal under that Act, but under its primary jurisdiction conferred by the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. 
(vi) enforced an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the 
statutory penalties in accordance with section 33 of the Credit Contracts Act. Section 
18(3) of the Disputes Tribunals Act enables a Tribunal to do this. 
(vi) granted relief from the statutory penalties in accordance with section 32 of 
the Credit Contracts Act. Section 32 is different from the other sections contained in 
Part II. It does not merely define a statutory entitlement but rather confers a power on 
a court to grant relief. A Disputes Tribunal is not a court for the purposes of section 
32. Section 32(1) provides that the Court may, on the application of the creditor, 
order: 
(a) that any of the sections 24 to 28 [the penalty provisions] shall not apply; or 
(b) that an amount for which liability has been extinguished pursuant to any of tho e 
sections be reduced to an amount specified by the Court. 
A Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise these types of powers also, again under its 
general jurisdiction as provided in sections 18 and 19 of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
Section 18(6) of the Disputes Tribunals Act states that a Tribunal shall not be bound 
to apply the law. Thus a Tribunal already has the jurisdiction to order that 'any of the 
ections 24 to 28 shall not apply'. Furthermore, the Tribunal can reduce the statutory 
penalties, as contemplated by section 32( 1 )(b) of the Credit Contracts Act, by virtue of 
its power to reduce liability under section 19(l)(b) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
However, as the Tribunal's jurisdiction derives from the Disputes Tribunals Act, it 
must act within that jurisdiction and is therefore bound to determine the dispute on the 
1 Kynaston~ Hamish 
,.,__-_ ....... ~ ..... , ±-
substantial merits and justice of the case. It cannot refer to the broader grounds 
specified in section 32(2) of the Credit Contracts Act. The Tribunal is limited to the 
jurisdiction that is conferred by the Disputes Tribunals Act and cannot claim any 
additional powers unless they are specified in another enactment. The Credit 
Contracts Act does not confer any additional powers with respect to Part II, but only 
to Part I. 
This expansive interpretation of the Disputes Tribunals Act in relation to ection 32 of 
the Credit Contracts Act goes against even that of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs.58 
In the Ministry's opinion, a Tribunal cannot exercise the kind of power anticipated by 
section 32. It is important to note that even if this is the case, this does not entail that 
an application by a credit provider under section 32 will oust a Tribunal's jurisdiction 
altogether. 
Section 36( 1) of the Disputes Tribunals Act only requires a Tribunal to strike or 
transfer proceedings if it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine those proceedings. 
Jurisdiction is only limited as to the powers a Tribunal can lawfully exercise; a 
Tribunal could still hear and determine the dispute under its section I 0(1) claim 
jurisdiction. Therefore the Tribunal could still order that the statutory penalties for 
non-disclosure be imposed, but this order would be subject to the credit providers 
right to apply to the District Court for relief under section 32 of the Credit Contracts 
Act. This is perfectly in keeping with the self enforcing nature of the Credit Contracts 
Act, the importance assigned to disclosure in the Act59and the requirement that the 
penalty provisions be 'subject to' section 32. Furthermore, section 19(2) of the 
Disputes Tribunals Act specifically authorises a Tribunal to impose such conditions 
as it sees fit. Thus the Tribunal is authorised to make an order 'subject to' an 
application for relief. 
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However, it is submitted that this unduly burdens both parties and unnecessarily 
complicates the process. The forseeable consequence of accepting the Ministry's 
interpretation is that credit providers will always apply for relief under section 32 and 
therefore, the whole purpose of admitting access to the Disputes Tribunals - avoiding 
the difficulties associated with access to the Courts - is defeated. The objectives of 
the legislation are only really achieved if Tribunals have jurisdiction over the whole 
of Part II. 
C The Hire Purchase Act 1971 
Section 47 A of the Hire Purchase Act provides that a Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
to exercise the powers conferred by sections I 0( 1) and 26(2) of this Act. Again, the 
implication, by the maxim expressio unius, is that a Tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction to exercise the powers contained in the rest of the Act. However, it is 
submitted that this implication does not limit any pre-existing jurisdiction conferred 
by the Disputes Tribunals Act. A Disputes Tribunal is authorised to hear certain 
claims and exercise certain powers by the Disputes Tribunals Act. It is also authorised 
to exercise such other jurisdiction as is conferred on it by any other enactment. This 
supplementary jurisdiction should not detract from the Tribunals' former type of 
jurisdiction. To do so creates arbitrary distinctions in the law and unduly limits the 
effectiveness and accessibility of Disputes Tribunals to both consumers and traders. 
The Hire Purchase Act expressly increases the jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals with 
respect to two provisions. 
Section I 0( 1) of the Hire Purchase Act empowers a court to impose conditions on the 
variation of a hire purchase agreement. It also states that the variation will not be 
enforceable without the leave of the court. Prior to the enactment of ection 47 A of 
the Hire Purchase Act, a Disputes Tribunal was not specifically authorised to exercise 
such a power. The Tribunal was not 'the Court' for the purposes of the Hire Purchase 
Act and sections 18 and 19 of the Disputes Tribunals Act do not contain provision for 
this type of power. Therefore, it was necessary to expressly confer jurisdiction on 
Tribunals with respect to this section. 
Section 26(2) is the same. It provides for a very wide range of discretional powers to 
grant relief to the purchaser, including the power to vary the agreement, where a 
vendor has either served a notice of repossession or repossessed the goods. Prior to the 
enactment of section 47 A of the Hire Purchase Act, a Tribunal did not have the 
jurisdiction to exercise these powers. 
However, like the Credit Contracts Act, there are a number of provisions in the Hire 
Purchase Act over which a Tribunal could exercise its jurisdiction under the Disputes 
Tribunals Act, even though these are not specifically mentioned in section 47 A of the 
Hire Purchase Act. These include disputes relating to the lack of disclosure, the 
statutory penalties for non-compliance and the consequences of a failure to meet the 
statutory notice requirements. 
Until the enactment of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, these also included 
disputes as to the statutory requirements of quality and fitness contained in sections 11 
to 14 of the Hire Purchase Act. It is especially odd that a Tribunal should not be said 
to have jurisdiction with respect to these, as they were deemed to be implied terms in 
every hire purchase agreement. Yet this is precisely what the Justice Department 
maintained.60 This severely undermined the contractual jurisdiction of Disputes 
Tribunals and created an arbitrary distinction in the law, between ordinary contracts of 
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sale with implied terms of quality and fitness and hire purchase agreements with 
similar implied terms. 
This is not to argue that Tribunals have jurisdiction over the Hire Purchase Act in its 
entirety, only that they have the full extent of the jurisdiction that is conferred by the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. For example, section 35 permits the court to vary the 
judgments of other courts in relation to the hire purchase agreement. It is not 
appropriate that Disputes Tribunals should be able to exercise this power, and under 
the Disputes Tribunals Act they cannot. There are some additional sections over 
which a Tribunal cannot exercise its jurisdiction, such as sections 20, 31 and 45_61 
These may be a proper subject for reform, but at present a Tribunal cannot act in 
accordance with them because it does not have the power jurisdiction to do so. 
However, this should not prevent Disputes Tribunals from acting in accordance with 
the Hire Purchase Act, where that action is within the scope of the Tribunals' primary 
jurisdiction, as defined by the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
D The Door to Door Sales Act 1967 
Any credit contract not made at appropriate trade premises is covered by the Door to 
Door Sales Act. Under section 5 of that Act, a credit agreement not made at 
appropriate trade premises is deemed unenforceable if the dicJosure requirements of 
section 6 are not met. Section 6(ba) requires the finance rate and the total cost of 
credit to be disclosed in accordance with Part II of the Credit Contracts Act. 
Disputes Tribunals are not expressly mentioned under the Door to Door Sales Act. 
Therefore, any jurisdiction a Tribunal has over credit agreements not made at 
appropriate trade premises originates from the Dispute Tribunals Act. A Disputes 
Tribunal can hear a claim alleging non-disclosure in breach of the Door to Door Sales 
Act by its primary jurisdiction under section l 0( l) of the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
From here a Tribunal faces two possible alternatives: 
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(i) It could determine the claim but would be unable to declare the contract 
unenforceable. This possibility arises because of the expressio unius maxim. The 
argument is that because the Door to Door Sales Act imports the Credit Contracts Act 
provisions on non-disclosure and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction with respect 
to those it also does not have jurisdiction with respect to the Door to Door Sales Act. 
This is a long-winded argument and goes against the natural construction of the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. The Door to Door Sales Act does not confer an express 
jurisdiction on Disputes Tribunals, nor is it mentioned in the first schedule to the Act. 
However an express jurisdiction is established by section I 0( I) of the Disputes 
Tribunals Act. Therefore the Credit Contracts Act and section I 0(2) of the Disputes 
Tribunals Act are irrelevant. There is no basis for the claim that the supplementary 
jurisdiction established by section 10(2), or implications based on the Credit Contracts 
Act, limit the operation of Disputes Tribunals with respect to the Door to Door Sales 
Act. 
(ii) The Tribunal can declare the contract unenforceable under section 19(1 )(b) of 
the Dispute Tribunals Act in accordance with section 5 of the Door to Door Sales Act. 
This creates an interesting dichotomy. According to the restrictive interpretation of the 
Credit Contracts Act, a Disputes Tribunal does not have the requisite jurisdiction to 
declare a contract unenforceable for non-disclosure under the Credit Contracts Act. 
The disclosure provisions of the Credit Contracts Act and the Door to Door Sales Act 
are identical. Therefore, if the restrictive interpretation is correct, the power to declare 
a contract unenforceable depends solely on where the contract was executed! The 
alternative is to accept that Tribunals currently have the jurisdiction to enforce the 
disclosure provisions of the Credit Contracts Act, as well as those of the Door to Door 
Sales Act. This alternative is preferable. The question of jurisdiction should be based 
on more substantive considerations than the premises on which the contract was 
executed. 
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Therefore a Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Door to Door Sales Act by virtue of its 
general jurisdiction under section l 0( I) of the Disputes Tribunals Act, even though 
specific jurisdiction is not conferred by the Door to Door Sales Act. 
This same conclusion applies to all three Acts. Parliament has decided the scope of 
the Tribunals' jurisdiction in the Disputes Tribunals Act. Where necessary Parliament 
has increased that jurisdiction through other Acts. This specific jurisdiction 
supplements, but does not detract from, the primary jurisdiction conferred by the 
Disputes Tribunals Act. Given that the object behind the Disputes Tribunals Act is 
providing access to justice, and that the Hire Purchase, Credit Contracts and Door to 
Door Sales Acts aim to protect consumers, it is also the meaning which gives each Act 
such 'fair, large, and literal construction as will best assure the attainment of the object 
of [each] Act' in accordance with section SU) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924. 
There is scope in the legislation for jurisdiction; it only remains to be shown that 
jurisdiction is actually necessary. 
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IV SHOULD TRIBUNALS HA VE JURISDICTION? 
A Caveat Creditor and the Need for Realistic Enforcement 
All three Acts: the Credit Contracts Act; the Hire Purchase Act; and the Door to Door 
Sales Act are aimed at consumer protection. Concepts such as uniform disclosure are 
fundamental to their operational philosophy. This is evidenced by the preamble to the 
Credit Contracts Act - the aims of disclosure being to: 
(b) Ensure that all the terms of contracts are disclosed to debtors before they become 
irrevocably committed to them ; and 
(c) Ensure that the cost of credit is disclosed on a uniform basis in order to prevent 
deception and encourage competition . 
It is clear from the automatic imposition of treble damages that these aims are to be 
taken seriously.62 On its introduction into Parliament, former Prime Minister and 
Minister of Justice, Geoffrey Palmer stated: 
The old principle of common law was caveat emptor - let the buyer beware - but the 
new principle of common law in the Bill is caveat creditor - let the creditor beware. 
The Bill aims to improve the protection of the consumer.63 
The current situation makes a mockery of this principle. In a letter to the Justice and 
Law Reform Committee, dated 3 February 1994, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs 
stated: 
We receive a large number of enquiries and complaints about credit agreements and 
certainly these tend to be among the most serious. Frequently the disclosure 
provisions of the Credit Contracts Act have not been met. This may be a failure to 
disclose the finance rates,64or incorrectly taing the amount financed ... it is also 
common for the initial disclosure provisions to be flouted totally by failure to provide 
a copy of the credit agreement. 
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This situation has occurred because few consumers are aware of their rights under the 
Credit Contracts Act and even fewer have the knowledge, experience or finance to 
pursue an action against a credit provider in the District Court. The Credit Contracts, 
Door to Door Sales and Hire Purchase Acts were designed to provide self-help 
remedies to the consumer.65 This is apparent from the structure of the Acts; it is the 
creditor who must apply for relief from the 'automatic' penalties. However, under the 
present structure, where the only available enforcement agency is the District Court, 
this is not the case. In practice it is the debtor who must bring an action to court 
because credit providers are not likely to self-impose the penalties for non-disclosure. 
In some situations, where the disclosure provisions of the Credit Contracts Act have 
been breached, a consumer will stop making payments in accordance with the 
penalties. However this poses the risk of repossession when the amount owing under 
the contract minus the penalty - the 'specified amount' - is repaid. This is exacerbated 
for chattel mortgages where no notice is required before repossession.66 While in 
theory a consumer could negotiate with the credit provider to accept the reduction as a 
self-imposed penalty, this is extremely unlikely in practice, especially if the credit 
provider knows that the consumer will be forced to go to Court to enforce his or her 
rights under the Hire Purchase and Credit Contracts Acts. 
Furthermore, a Credit provider who knows that there is very little risk of enforcement 
is less likely to meet the various requirements, such as disclosure and proper notice, in 
the first place. There is in effect nothing to 'beware'. This is especially true where 
credit agreements are of a relatively low value because it is simply not worth the time 
and expense necessary to bring a claim to Court. Yet this is precisely where Disputes 
Tribunals would be most beneficial. This has been the evidence in Australia: 
The mere existence of the Tribunals is said to have induced businesses to be less 
recalcitrant because now there is greater possibility of an action being taken again l 
them.67 
Thus the presence of Tribunals can have a preventative effect also. If there is access to 
justice, there is less of a demand for it in the first place. The difference between New 
Zealand and Australia is that in Australia the legislation put in place to protect 
consumers is practically enforceable. 
It is naive to think that the threat of sanctions such as treble damages will change 
illegal trade practices unless there is access to an inexpensive, fast and authoritative 
mechanism for enforcing consumer rights. Viewed against the importance and the 
intended self-enforcing nature of the rights protected by the Hire Purchase and Credit 
Contracts Acts, it is insupportable that consumers should be denied access to Disputes 
Tribunals. 
B Access To Justice - an End in Itself 
The previous section looked at access to justice as a means to an end - namely the 
realistic enforcement of consumer legislation and thereby achievement of its 
objectives. However, there is a more fundamental issue at stake. Consumer legislation 
aims to protect the rights of consumers; not just some consumers, but all consumers. 
This aim cannot be achieved if the only means of enforcing those rights is through the 
courts, because those consumers who cannot afford to enter the court system receive 
no protection. Therefore most consumers with small claims do not have equal acces 
to justice because in practical terms they cannot afford to go to court. 
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However, expense is not the only factor in assessing the effectiveness of Tribunals as 
an accessible mechanism for resolving disputes and administering justice. Tribunals 
are also faster and are more responsive to particular fact situations. They are more 
representative of the community and do not reqire legal expertise. To deny consumers 
access to Disputes Tribunals when their rights have been clearly infringed is to 
seriously undermine the principles of equal access to justice. It places the consumer in 
a Catch 22 situation. He or she can either go to court or write off their loss; either way 
the consumer loses. At least by writing off the loss they lose less in terms of the time 
and effort it takes to get to court. 
C Enforcing Consumer Legislation - an Appropriate Function? 
The imposition of penalties requires the exercise of a punitive function . It has been 
suggested that this is not therefore an appropriate function for Disputes Tribunals to 
assume. This objection is misplaced. The penalties are an automatic sanction imposed 
by Parliament and as such can and should be enforced by Tribunals. The alternative is 
that the penalties will not be imposed at all because the courts are not a viable option 
for enforcing small claims. Most cases will involve a genuine dispute as the credit 
provider is likely to apply for relief under the legislation. It might be argued that the 
exercise of a punitive function is not consistent with the goals of settlement espoused 
by the Disputes Tribunals Act. Against this, section 33 of the Credit Contracts Act 
provides for the reduction of the statutory penalties by agreement between the parties. 
The consumer legislation actually incorporates the type of approach used by the 
Tribunals. Furthermore, settlement is not the only option open to the Tribunals. 
Section 18( 1) of the Disputes Tribunals Act recognises that adjudication may be more 
appropriate in certain circumstances. Hearing claims founded on contract such as, 
whether a contract is enforceable, whether the total cost of credit has been disclosed, 
or whether relief should be granted from the penalties for non-disclosure, is a function 
to be properly assumed by Disputes Tribunals . 
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It has also been argued that the complexity of credit disputes makes it more 
appropriate that jurisdiction be restricted to the courts. This is also misplaced. 
Referees have indicated that they do not consider credit disputes to be particularly 
complex compared with the variety of contractual disputes which come before the 
Tribunals.68 Nor are credit agreements so complex that a Tribunal cannot re-open a 
contract that it decides to be oppressive within the meaning of Part I of the Credit 
Contracts Act, or vary an agreement in accordance with section 26(2) of the Hire 
Purchase Act. Most of the issues arising under these Acts are purely factual and 
therefore a referee is no less qualified than a judge to resolve them. 
The objection is stronger when the Tribunals' approach to legal issues is called into 
question. Complex legal issues can arise under the Credit Contracts, Hire Purchase 
and Door to Door Sales Acts. The agreements they cover are binding, legal 
agreements, entered into on the understanding that the law would govern their 
operation. Yet under section 18(6) of the Disputes Tribunals Act a Tribunal is not 
bound to apply the law. Referees are not required to be legally trained, and only about 
a quarter currently are.69 Lawyers are not permitted to be present at the hearing, and 
the prohibition on costs discourages even legal advice.70 Taking these factors into 
account, are Disputes Tribunals the appropriate forum for resolving consumer 
disputes? 
The answer is still yes. The initial response to these objections is that Tribunals are 
enabled to resolve the legal issues which arise under Part I of the Credit Contracts 
Act, and are therefore equipped to answer the issues arising under Part II also. 
However, even this limited jurisdiction might raise some objections, so this is no 
answer. 
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V SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
A Raising the Monetary Limit 
Section 10(3) of the Disputes Tribunals Act provides that: 
... a claim is within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal only if the total amount in respect of 
which an order of the Tribunal is sought does not exceed $ 3 OOO ... 
Under section 13, this can be extended to $ 5 OOO by an agreement between the 
parties. 
The wording of section 10(3) enables a Tribunal to have some flexibility. In Tuulua v 
Jackson72 T was entitled to a maximum of$ 5672.40. They reduced their claim to a 
total of $ 3000 in order to bring it within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. However, J had 
applied for a reduction of penalties under the Credit Contracts Act. This reduction 
should not be subtracted from the figure of$ 3000, but instead it should be subtracted 
from the initial figure of$ 5672.40. In this way, even if a reduction was granted, T 
still may have been able to recover $ 3000. Applicants should word their claims so 
that the sum of the total amount to which they are entitled, less any reductions, does 
not exceed $ 3000. This is some compensation for having to reduce the amount of the 
claim in the first place. 
The reduction of claims in order to satisfy the $ 3000 monetary limit are a common-
place occurrence; testimony to the fact that " ... there is a signifcant gap between the 
current monetary limit in the Disputes Tribunals and what is financially viable to take 
to the District Court."73 In accordance with this the Ministry of Consumer Affairs has 
recommended that the monetary limit be raised to $ 5000, with an additional limit of 
$ I O OOO by agreement between the parties.74 There is some merit in these 
recommendations. The monetary limit has not been reviewed in seven years and it is 
probably in keeping with inflation and the increasing competence of Disputes 
Tribunals. 
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In general terms the viability of the Tribunals' quasi-legal jurisdiction has already been 
discussed.71 However, in relation to the three 'consumer Acts', as far as the parties' 
expectations go, if they expect the Jaw to govern their relationship then it is likely that 
this will significantly affect the approach adopted by the Tribunal. In fact the merits 
are unlikely to deviate much from the Jaw as the Hire Purchase, Credit Contracts and 
Door to Door Sales Act seem tailor-made for the Tribunals' special jurisdiction. For 
instance, section 32 of the Credit Contracts Act which provides for relief from the 
statutory penalties for non-disclosure is highly permissive. In deciding to make such 
an order the court can take into account 'such other matters as it sees fit'. This clearly 
allows for a 'substantial merits and justice' approach to dispute resolution . 
Furthermore, disputes will often arise between parties who have an ongoing credit 
relationship and therefore it may be more appropriate that they decide for themselves 
the future operation of that relationship (with the help of a referee), rather than have a 
decision imposed by the court which may be practically unworkable or unsatisfactory 
for future dealings. A practical resolution will often be more desirable than a 
singularly legal one - moreso when the cost of a legal resolution far exceeds the 
benefits to be had from it. The consumer claims which come before the Tribunal are 
everday disputes, brought by ordinary people without legal expertise or huge budgets 
marked 'justice'. Instances of non-disclosure or insufficient notice are everyday 
occurrences suffered by consumers all too often. Some remedy, even a non-legal one, 
is better than none. 
Therefore, the Disputes Tribunals jurisdiction is both necessary and appropriate for 
the enforcement of consumer rights under the Hire Purchase, Credit Contracts and 
Door to Door Sales Act. There is a social need for jurisdiction and there is cope for 
jurisdiction within the existing provisions of the Disputes Tribunals Act, in 
combination with these three consumer Acts. It only remains for thi to be recognised. 
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However, caution should be exercised. If the monetary limit is raised too high, the 
informal method of dispute resolution may no longer be acceptable to the parties. 
Thus the additional limit of$ I O OOO is tempered by the parties' agreement. 
There is a more far reaching concern. It is because of the comparatively small amounts 
in contention that Tribunals operate in the way that they do. Some commentators have 
rejected this approach as arbitrary, arguing that it should be the type of case and the 
type of relationship which determine the process, not the amount in issue.75 
This argument, though sound in theory, is misplaced in practice. For one thing, the 
amount disputed does actually provide some 'rough and ready' boundaries for the 
types of disputes that are heard. For another, small claims courts are established to 
meet a practical necessity - dispute resolution without the prohibitive cost of the legal 
process: 
The truth of course, is that elaborate procedural rules and complex formalities are 
incompatible with claims for small sums not because these claims are inherently 
simpler or because fairness does not matter in the redress of 'small' legal grievances, 
but because elaborate and complex rules demand that lawyers interpret them and 
lawyers are too expensive.76 
If the monetary limit is raised too high, too quickly, lawyers will inevitably become 
involved. There will simply be too much at stake. Again this will shift the focus of the 
Tribunals away from a merits based, individualised approach to a legalised, 
adversarial one. This may result in the 'capture' of Tribunals by businesse _77 This is 
not what Tribunals were established to do. 
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Even though they are no longer called 'Small Claims Tribunals', Disputes Tribunals 
are essentially a court for small claims. This is an important and defining feature of 
their operation and success, and should not be compromised. Therefore, while the 
monetary limit should keep pace with inflation, it should not be significantly increased 
beyond that. Money, after all, is the root of all evil. 
B Appeals on Questions of Law 
Saban v Crone78 illustrated that even where a Tribunal mistakenly asserts jurisdiction 
and makes a determination accordingly, a party cannot appeal to the District Court to 
have that determination reversed. This is a matter of some concern, especially given 
that, in practice, jurisdictional limits are instructions to court staff who are not legally 
trained and who have the initial responsibility for accepting and rejecting claims. The 
general impression to be had from Referees is that acceptance of a claim ettles the 
question of jurisdiction.79 
It is interesting to note that Parliament chose not to remedy this when the Disputes 
Tribunals Act was introduced. Obviously an applicant could bring an action for 
judicial review in the High Court, but the costs are likely to be prohibitive given the 
sums involved. Some reform of the process is necessary to prevent Tribunals from 
making determinations outside the ambit of their jurisdiction. Rossiter80 suggests an 
amendment to section 50 to include the right to appeal on questions of law, or at the 
very least, where jurisdiction is in issue. 
This solution is not practical. Firstly, allowing appeals on questions of law would 
again over-legalise Tribunals. Tribunals operate a quasi-legal jurisdiction and as such 
it is not appropriate that the ordinary courts, functioning on a different level of 
inquiry, have the jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Tribunals. 81 Secondly, an 
appeal to the District Court can be just as prohibitive in terms of cost as an application 
t, '~ . 
4 ~ .· 
\.t• I : l Kynaston . Hamish 
i "ti,.. 
for review in the High Court, especially where there is the very real possibility of costs 
being awarded. 
A more practical solution is to reform the process before the problem occurs, by 
training court staff and referees to review juridiction carefully. Borderline cases can be 
referred to the court's legal advisers for more detailed investigation prior to the 
hearing.82 In this way excessive costs and delay are avoided and the Tribunal can 
focus on the more substantive issues raised in the dispute. 
C Reforming Consumer Legislation 
Even though it has been shown that there is scope m the current legislation, 
amendments to the Credit Contracts, Hire Purchase and Door to Door Sales Acts 
would be useful in order to clarify the jurisdiction of Disputes Tribunals with respect 
to these consumer Acts. Specifically, jurisdiction should be extended to enable a 
Tribunal to enforce the disclosure provisions of all three Acts. This would simply 
confirm the jurisdiction established under the Disputes Tribunals Act. 
It may be that an amendment to section 10 of the Disputes Tribunals Act would have 
the same effect. For instance, section 10(2) could be redrafted to read: 
(2*) Without limiting the jurisdiction of Tribunals conferred by section 10( 1) of this 
Act a Tribunal shall have such other jurisdiction as is conferred on it by any of the 
enactments specified in the First Schedule to this Act. 
This is a more simple amendment, but it has a much wider impact. However, there is 
no risk involved as the Tribunal would till be restricted to exercising only those 
powers set down by Parliament in the Disputes Tribunals Act. This would limit any 
confusion created by the expressio unius maxim, as well as allowing the Tribunals 
jurisdiction where, because of an oversight in the drafting stage, the Tribunals' 
jurisdiction might have been excluded. 
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There are also a number of provisions in the Hire Purchase Act over which Dispute 
Tribunals do not have jurisdiction, but should have. Section 20 allows the court to 
assign title absolutely to the purchaser if the vendor unreasonably witholds consent to 
do so. Section 31 enables a court to direct the sale of goods in a manner, and subject 
to such terms and conditions as the court sees fit to impose. Section 45 empowers a 
court to extend the statutory time limits on notice. These are important provisions in 
the Hire Purchase Act and there does not seem to be any reason why a Disputes 
Tribunal should not have the jurisdiction to enforce them. Hire purchase agreements 
frequently cover goods worth less than $ 5000. Therefore disputes are often likely to 
be 'small disputes'. Unless Tribunals have jurisdiction, the provisions of the Hire 
Purchase Act are not likely to be enforced at this level. This undermines the rights of 
consumers to protection and to a remedy if that protection fails. Therefore an 
amendment is necessary to increase the Tribunals jurisdiction. 
D A Separate Credit Tribunal 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has recommended that consideration be given to 
setting up a specialist credit division of the Disputes Tribunals.83 This has obvious 
advantages. Specialisation will increase the expertise of the Tribunals in relation to 
credit disputes. It will probably also increase the availability and effectiveness of class 
actions.84 
There is however a danger of the 'slippery slope'. Too much specialisation may result 
in confusion as to jurisdiction and may also decrease the effectiveness of Tribunals to 
deal with the wide range of grievances which come before them in 'ordinary' disputes. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Disputes Tribunals provide access to a fast, inexpensive, informal and fair mechanism 
for the resolution of disputes. As such they are a valuable mechanism for consumers. 
For comparatively small claims they are the only mechanism available to con umers -
the expense and effort involved in bringing a claim to court is prohibitive given the 
size of the claim. Most consumer disputes centre around small claims and therefore a 
resolution in the District Court is simply not available to most consumers. 
However, even the availability of Disputes Tribunals has been limited. The District 
Court has in some instances imposed restrictions on the informal, quasi-legal method 
of dispute resolution. This is central to the operation of Disputes Tribunals and their 
ability to deal with consumer disputes fairly and on an individualised basis. The 
Justice Department has interpreted consumer legislation narrowly so that the 
Tribunals have no jurisdiction with respect to a number of provisions which extend 
valuable protection to consumers. Accordingly, these provisions are not being 
enforced at the small claims level and the purpose of the legislation is defeated. 
This is insupportable. Parliament has defined the full nature and extent of the 
Tribunals' Jurisdiction in the Disputes Tribunals Act and has thereby empowered 
Tribunals to administer a special kind of justice, over a special kind of di pute in order 
to achieve a special kind of objective. Disputes Tribunals and the courts " ... are not 
simply institutions for settling disputes; they are a political resource designed to 
achieve broad redistributive goals."85 The justice system cannot, and should not, limit 
what is ultimately a political decision. 
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In fact separate Credit Tribunals are probably unnecessary, the Ministry only urging 
'consideration'. The present system is equipped to deal with a whole range of 
consumer disputes, including credit disputes. However, if established the proposed 
Credit Tribunals should remain a division of the Disputes Tribunals and as such 
should retain the quasi-legal jurisdiction and monetary limit provided by the Disputes 
Tribunals Act. The increased expertise gained from specialisation should not be used 
to justify separate Credit Tribunals to hear both small claims and large claims. This 
would again marginalise the small claimant without access to legal expertise. 
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Annex 1 : Rekvant provisions of sections 18 and 19 of the Disputt:s Trihunals Act. 
18. Function~ of Tri bun al -
(l) The Trihunal shall as regards every claim within its jurisdiction. assess 
whether. in all the circumstances. it is appropriate for the Tribunal to assist the parties 
to reach an agreed settlement in relation to the claim. 
(3) \\, ncn: the parties reach an agreed scnJement the Tribunal may approve the 
settlement. and the settlement shall then take c:ff ecl as if it \Vere an order of the T ribunaJ 
made under subsection (8) of this section. and shall be enforceable in accordance with 
section 4 7 of this Act. 
(6) The Tribunal shall ddermine the dispute according to the substantial merits 
and justice of the case. and in doing so shall have regard to the law hut hall not he 
hound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities. 
19. Orders of Tribunal -(1) A Tribunal may. as regards any daim \\.ithin its 
jwisdiction. make one or more of the following orders : 
(a) The Tribun'al may order a party to the proceedings to pay money to any 
other party: 
(b) The Triburrnl may make an order declaring that a person is not liable in 
respect of a claim or demand described in section 10( 1 )(b) of this Act: 
(c) The Tribunal may order a party to deliver specific property to another party 
to the proceedings: 
( d) TIH:: Tribunal may make a work onkr against any party to the proceedings : 
( e) \\ nere it appears to the Tribunal that .111 agreement b1.:m ccn the parries. ur 
any term of any such agreement. is harsh or uri .... . , 1. -...i - .He. or that ::m~ power 
conferred by .in agreement bt:m·een them has been exercised in a harsh or 
unconscionahk manner. the Tribunal may mal-e an order varying or setting aside, the 
agreement, or setting it aside ( either wholly or in part) : 
(f) \\ bere it appears to the Tribunal that an agreement be1'.¥een the parties has 
been induced by fraud_ misrepresentation . or mistake. or any writing purporting to 
express the agreement betvveen the parties does not accord ,vith their true agreement 
the Tribunal may mtle an orda ":1rying, or setting aside. the agreement or the writing 
(eitht: r '.vholly or in part): 
( g) Th(;! T ribun::il may make an order dismissing the claim. 
(2) .-\ny order made by a Tribun;il m.1y Qe unconditional. or , ubjec t to such 
conditions (whether as to the time for. or mode of ompLiance. or othen-.;isr) as the 
Tribunal thinks fit to impose. 
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